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THE DEREGULATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
Kenneth Williams*
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly before retiring from the Supreme Court in 1994,
Justice Harry Blackmun issued a stinging dissenting opinion
from the denial of certiorari in a capital case.' In his opinion,
Justice Blackmun announced his opposition to capital pun-
ishment and asserted that:
Having virtually conceded that both fairness and ration-
ality cannot be achieved in the administration of the death
penalty,... the Court has chosen to deregulate the entire
enterprise, replacing, it would seem, substantive constitu-
tional requirements with mere aesthetics, and abdicating
its statutorily and constitutionally imposed duty to pro-
vide meaningful judicial oversight to the administration of
death by the states.2
This article demonstrates that Justice Blackmun correctly as-
serted that the death penalty has been deregulated. In recent
years, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to
completely overlook unfair procedures in death penalty cases.
The Court has placed almost no restrictions on the manner in
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Southern University, Thurgood Mar-
shall School of Law. J.D., University of Virginia; B.A., University of San Fran-
cisco. The author would like to first thank the organizers of the First National
Meeting of the Regional People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference for al-
lowing him to present this paper at the conference. In addition, he would like to
thank Professors Dwight Aaron and Pamela Edwards and others for attending
his presentation and for providing helpful comments. He would next like to
thank Professors Thomas Kleven and Melissa Koehn for their helpful sugges-
tions after reading a draft of the article. Finally, he would like to thank the De-
troit College of Law at Michigan State University, where he spent the 1998-99
academic year as a visiting professor, for allowing him to teach a death penalty
seminar and for providing the funds for him to attend the Gideon conference on
the right to counsel at the University of Maryland Law School.
1. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2. Id.
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which states impose the death penalty. Further, the Court
and Congress have eliminated most federal court regulations
of death penalty sentences. For example, the Supreme Court
and Congress have placed restrictions on the filing of writs of
habeas corpus, created the harmless error rule, and estab-
lished the non-retroactivity doctrine, all of which prevent
death row inmates from obtaining relief. Justice Blackmun
called these restrictions the "Byzantine morass of arbitrary,
unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments to the vindica-
tion of federal rights."3 In addition, the Supreme Court-ei-
ther through the creation of a death penalty friendly doctrine
and manipulation of that doctrine, or by ignoring and refus-
ing to address certain important issues, such as racial dis-
crimination in the imposition of the death penalty-upholds
the death penalty at all costs. This result occurs even at the
cost of constitutional rights. More disturbingly, this deregu-
lation takes place as the use of the death penalty expands.
This article attempts to "make the record," as Stephen
Reinhardt, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, has suggested,4 to show the diffi-
culties the Supreme Court places on inmates sentenced to
death to vindicate their constitutional rights. The article
demonstrates how the U.S. Supreme Court, through a series
of decisions and denials of certiorari since 1976, abdicates its
constitutional responsibility to ensure that the death penalty
is fairly administered. The article also discusses Congress's
role in simultaneously expanding the death penalty and de-
regulating the federal role in ensuring its fair administration.
Furthermore, this article offers reasons why deregulation oc-
curs and analyzes whether the state courts can fairly admin-
ister the death penalty. Finally, this article concludes with
reasons why the federal courts' role in administering the
death penalty is so vital.
3. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting).
4. See Stephen Reinhardt, The Anatomy of An Execution: Fairness vs. Pro-
cess 1 (2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) ("[lilt is neverthe-
less the duty of the academy and the legal profession to make the record that
will be necessary when the pendulum swings.").
678 [Vol. 40
2000] DEREGULATING THE DEATH PENALTY
II. EXPANSION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
Deregulation of the death penalty is important given its
recent expansion. This recent expansion includes increases in
the numbers of crimes punishable by death, inmates exe-
cuted, and states adopting the death penalty. In 1994, Con-
gress passed, and the President signed, the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.' The new law
dramatically expands the number of federal offenses punish-
able by death.6 Newly created offenses now punishable by
death include drive-by shootings resulting in death;7 drug
trafficking in large quantities;8 attempting, authorizing, or
advising the killing of any public officer, juror, or witness in a
case involving a continuing criminal enterprise;9 smuggling
aliens where death results;'1 and torture resulting in death
outside the United States." Congress further expanded the
death penalty by making certain existing federal crimes pun-
ishable by death"2 and by resurrecting death penalty statutes
deemed unconstitutional by purportedly curing their constitu-
tional deficiencies. 3
The number of inmates executed in recent years has in-
creased dramatically. From 1976, when the Supreme Court
reinstated the death penalty, 4 to 1990, 143 inmates were exe-
cuted." Between 1990 and 1999, however, 478 executions oc-
5. See Randall Coyne, The Federal Death Penalty Explosion, reprinted in
RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPrrAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDIcIAL
PROCESS 151 (Supp. 1998). See also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
6. See COYNE, supra note 5, at 151.
7. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 36 (West Supp. 1999).
8. See id. § 3591(b)(1).
9. See id. § 3591(b)(2).
10. See id. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv) (West 1999).
11. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340(A). For an exhaustive list of newly created fed-
eral crimes punishable by death, see COYNE, supra note 5, at 151-53.
12. Existing federal crimes made capital offenses include: (1) car jacking re-
sulting in death, see 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (West Supp. 1999); (2) child molestation
committed within federal territorial jurisdiction, such as a federal day care, re-
sulting in death, see id. § 2245; (3) genocide, see id. § 1091; (4) hostage taking
resulting in death, see id. § 1203; (5) murder for hire, see id. § 1958; (6) murder
in order to aid racketeering activity, see id. § 1959; and (7) civil rights violations
where death results, see id. §§ 241, 242, 245, 247.
13. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1751(a) (West 1994) (assassination of the President
or Vice-President); id. § 2381 (treason).
14. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (reinstating the death pen-
alty).
15. See Mark Warren, Death Penalty Information Center (last visited Jan.
679
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curred. 6 Thus, in a nine-year period, the number of execu-
tions more than tripled the number carried out during the
previous fourteen-year period.
Finally, during the 1990s both New York 7 and Kansas18
reinstated the death penalty. Given the increase in crimes
punishable by death, the recent increase in executions, and
the addition of New York and Kansas as death penalty juris-
dictions, the number of individuals sentenced to death and
the number of executions will certainly rise in the foreseeable
future. As this article demonstrates, the courts ironically re-
treat from their constitutional obligation to police the death
penalty at the very time such policing is most needed.
III. THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
A- History and Purpose
The federal courts routinely review death sentences after
inmates file writs of habeas corpus. As a result, a review of
the history of the writ and its importance to death row in-
mates follows.
The writ of habeas corpus, as is the case with most
American law, originated in England. In 1641, the Habeas
Corpus Act was passed, providing that anyone imprisoned by
a court, the king, his counsel, or his councils had the right to
be brought upon demand to judges of the King's bench or to
the court of Common Pleas without delay. 9
The colonies then introduced habeas corpus into the
American legal scheme." At the time of the Constitutional
Convention in 1787, all but one of the original member states
had adopted either an express constitutional provision perti-
nent to habeas corpus or a practice allowing it.2' As a result,
there was no debate about the habeas corpus provision in the
U.S. Constitution. The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted the fed-
14, 1999) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/foreignnatl.html>.
16. See id.
17. See Alan Finder, Death Penalty Is Challenged in State Court, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1998, at Bi.
18. See Tony Rizzo, Amendment May Affect Death Penalty in Kansas, KAN.
CITY STAR, July 2, 1998, at Al.
19. See John T. Philipsborn, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 16 THE
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eral judiciary the power to issue writs of habeas corpus.22 The
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 made the writ applicable to state
prisoners.' The inclusion of habeas corpus in the federal
Constitution resulted from the belief that the writ provided
important protections for the individual against the sover-
eign.24 Although the Constitution includes a provision per-
mitting the suspension of the writ,' only during the Civil War
was the writ suspended.26  Thus, throughout United States
history the writ of habeas corpus has been available to defen-
dants who claim deprivation of mandated procedural protec-
tions, whether convicted by either the federal government or
the states.
B. Importance of the Writ in Death Penalty Proceedings
The primary target of deregulation efforts has been the
federal writ of habeas corpus. A death row inmate's best
chance of having his conviction and sentence overturned and
his constitutional rights vindicated traditionally occurs after
filing a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Federal habeas
writs result in reversals of approximately fifty percent of all
death sentences. There are several reasons why death row
inmates achieve greater success during the federal habeas
procedure. First, convictions often occur because defendants
lack the resources to hire talented and motivated counsel.'
As a result, indigent capital defendants must frequently rely
on court-appointed attorneys who often lack the skills, re-
22. See STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS
OF REVIEW § 7.02 (2d ed. 1992).
23. See CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 22, § 7.02.
24. See Philipsborn, supra note 19, at 27.
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
26. See Philipsborn, supra note 19, at 27.
27. See Ronald J. Tabak, Capital Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in
This Corpus?, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 523, 526 (1996) (estimating that death row
inmates received relief in 47% of habeas cases decided between 1976 and 1991);
see also EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 148 (1998) ("On habeas, the
Fifth and Eleventh circuits (which included most of the southern states) over-
turned capital convictions or death sentences in the vast majority of the cases
they decided, even though state courts in the same cases previously had found
no constitutional violations."); Nicholas J. Trenticosta, A Constitutional Crisis:
Justice Without Post-Conviction Representation, 44 LA. B.J. 232, 233 (1996)
("I]t is known that at least 40 percent of the federal habeas corpus cases have
resulted in the death sentences being reversed.., in Louisiana... a whopping
48 percent have been reversed.").
28. See LAZARUS, supra note 27, at 127.
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sources, and commitment to handle capital cases.29 "Almost
without exception, a prerequisite for receiving a death sen-
tence is the inability to hire a lawyer sufficiently talented or
motivated to mount a credible defense either at trial or at the
separate sentencing proceeding, which followed on convic-
tion."" Somewhat ironically, death row inmates receive bet-
ter representation during federal habeas proceedings. Some
of the best advocates in the country, attorneys from organiza-
tions such as the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Southern Pov-
erty Law Center, and the California Appellate Project, take
on habeas petitions. These attorneys offer the type of bril-
liant, dedicated representation that is often lacking during
the initial trial.3
Second, death row inmates are not likely to succeed on
direct appeal. Appellate attorneys, often appointed by the
same court that appointed trial counsel, are frequently as in-
competent as trial attorneys.2 Even when appellate counsel
is competent and discovers constitutional violations, appellate
courts often deny relief because the trial counsel failed to ob-
ject or the court finds the violation harmless.3
Finally, relief is also unlikely on direct appeal since most
state judges are elected34 and the consequences for overturn-
ing death sentences have often proven fatal.3' Federal judges,
by contrast, do not endure elections, receiving life tenure
upon appointment. This distinction is important to death row
inmates since their direct appeals are decided by state judges,
who must justify their decisions to the typically pro-capital
29. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for
the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Bright, Counsel for the Poor].
30. See LAZARUS, supra note 27, at 127.
3L See Robert Weisberg, Who Defends Capital Defendants?, 35 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 535, 537 (1995).
32. See Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 29, at 1848 ("The poor per-
son sentenced to death may be represented by a lawyer with little or no appel-
late experience, no knowledge of capital punishment law, and little or no incen-
tive or inclination to provide vigorous advocacy.").
33. See Weisberg, supra note 31, at 537.
34. Judges face elections in 41 states. See Alan Ellis, Habeas Corpus and
the Clinton Administration, 16 CHAMPION 24, 24 (1992).
35. See Stephen B. Bright, The Politics of Capital Punishment: The Sacrifice
of Fairness for Executions, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 117, 124 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Bright,
The Politics of Capital Punishment].
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punishment voters.
Proponents of capital punishment recognize the impor-
tance of the federal habeas proceedings. After its expansion
by the Warren Court, these proponents began an assault on
the writ, culminating with the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996.6
C. The Warren Court and Expansion of the Writ
Three decisions of the Warren Court during the 1960s
greatly expanded the use of the federal writ of habeas corpus.
In Fay v. Noia" after a murder defendant failed to perfect a
timely appeal of his conviction, he filed a federal habeas peti-
tion.38 The federal district court denied relief on the grounds
that the defendant's failure to timely appeal in the state re-
viewing court constituted a procedural default of his claims."
However, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
procedural failure of the petitioner did not deny him federal
habeas relief unless the defendant deliberately bypassed state
procedures and intentionally forfeited an opportunity for
state review.0 In Townsend v. Sain,41 the Supreme Court
held that habeas proceedings generally entitle petitioners to
an evidentiary hearing on any unresolved factual issues con-
cerning their claims in federal court." Finally, in Sanders v.
United States," the Court held that relief could be granted to
a successor habeas petition, after denial of an earlier petition.
The lone exception to the Sanders rule is if counsel had
knowledge of the successor claim when filing the earlier peti-
tion and deliberately failed to raise the claim." In these three
cases, the Warren Court sent a clear message that it would
36. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241-2266 (West Supp. 1999). See infra Part Ifl.F.
37. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
38. See id. at 396-97.
39. See id. at 396.
40. See id. at 438.
41. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
42. See id. Habeas petitioners were entitled to an evidentiary hearing if. (1)
the merits of any factual dispute had not been resolved; (2) the state courts'
findings were not supported by the record; (3) the fact finding procedures em-
ployed by the state court were inadequate; (4) there was newly discovered evi-
dence; (5) crucial evidence was not adequately developed at the state hearing; or
(6) if it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the applicant a full and
fair hearing. See id. at 313-18.
43. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
44. See id. at 18.
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monitor violations of federal constitutional rights in state
courts and not allow procedural rules to present obstacles to
consideration of habeas claims.
D. The Burger Court and the Beginning of Retrenchment
The retrenchment of the federal writ began with the
Burger Court's decision in Wainwright v. Sykes.45 In Wain-
wright, the Court modified Fay v. Noia48 by holding that when
a federal habeas petitioner fails to raise a constitutional claim
in state court the petitioner must (1) show cause as to why
the a constitutional claim was not raised, and (2) demonstrate
that the alleged constitutional violation prejudiced the defen-
dant." This new standard made it more difficult for an in-
mate to raise issues for the first time in a federal habeas peti-
tion. In Fay, the Warren Court only required that the inmate
not deliberately bypass state court.48 The more onerous Bur-
ger Court standard required a showing of cause and prejudice
before an issue could be raised for the first time in a federal
habeas petition.49 This obstacle to bringing a federal habeas
petition acted as a precursor to the most serious retrench-
ment of the federal writ, which came under the Rehnquist
Court.
E. Continued Retrenchment Under the Rehnquist Court
The Rehnquist Court rendered four decisions that seri-
ously impacted death row inmates' ability to obtain federal
habeas relief.
1. Teague and the Court's Failure to Apply "New"
Constitutional Rules to Collateral Appeals
One major hurdle to obtaining federal habeas relief is the
doctrine of retroactivity announced by the Supreme Court in
Teague v. Lane."0 In Teague, the petitioner, a black man, was
convicted by an all-white jury of three counts of attempted
murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggra-
45. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
46. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
47. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 90-91.
48. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 438.
49. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 90-91.
50. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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vated battery.51 During jury selection, the prosecutor used all
ten of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks.52 On ap-
peal, the petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of its
peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury denied
the defendant his right to trial by a jury that is representa-
tive of the community.53 Both the Illinois Supreme Court and
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's claim on di-
rect review.54 The petitioner subsequently filed a habeas peti-
tion in federal court.55 While the habeas petition was pending
in federal court, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Batson v.
Kentucky, which held that the Equal Protection Clause for-
bids the prosecution from using its peremptory challenges to
exclude venire persons from the jury solely because of their
race." In Teague, the Court faced the question of whether
Batson applied to the petitioner on collateral review.57
The Court held that it would apply any newly rendered
decision to cases still on direct review.5 However, a new deci-
sion announcing a "new rule" 9 of constitutional law would not
affect cases on collateral appeal. 60 Thus, the petitioner in
Teague did not benefit from the Batson decision.
Teague significantly impacts death row inmates because
it is often in the habeas process that defendants present their
best claims for the first time. Therefore, a death row inmate
may present a valid claim during the habeas process that the
court will not address because it considers the claim "new."
5L See id. at 292-93.




56. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
57. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 288.
58. See id. at 303.
59. The Court defined a "new rule" of constitutional law as one not dictated
by prior precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final,
or one which breaks new ground or imposes new obligations on the states or the
federal government. See id. at 301.
60. See id. The Court did create two exceptions to the rule of non-
retroactivity. First, a new rule will be applied retroactively to cases on collat-
eral review "if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct be-
yond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.'" Id. at 307
(quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)). Second, new rules
will be applied retroactively if they require "the observance of those procedures
that.., are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. For this exception to
apply, "the procedure at issue must implicate the fundamental fairness of the
trial." Id. at 313.
685
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Furthermore, Teague makes it less likely that the Supreme
Court will grant a writ of certiorari in a capital case.
[I]f a habeas petitioner was seeking relief based on settled
law (making him eligible for the Court's consideration),
almost by definition his case did not raise the kind of
novel and interesting issue that might cause the Justices
to grant review. But if a petitioner raised a novel and in-
teresting claim, he'd be "Teagued-out"--disqualified for
seeking a new rule. For death row inmates, who were al-
most always seeking at least a modestly new wrinkle on
established principles, this had the makings of a night-
61
mare.
A good illustration of the difficulty Teague creates for
death row inmates is the Supreme Court's decision in O'Dell
v. Netherland." In O'Dell, a Virginia state court convicted the
defendant of murder, rape, and sodomy." The prosecutor ar-
gued for a death sentence, claiming the defendant presented a
future danger to society.' The defendant sought unsuccess-
fully to inform the jury that under Virginia law, a sentence of
life imprisonment renders the defendant ineligible for pa-
role.65 His direct appeal was denied and his conviction be-
came final in 1988.66 The defendant subsequently filed a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus based on his denial of the
opportunity to inform the jury of .his parole ineligibility.
While the writ was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in
Simmons v. South Carolina, that where a death row inmate's
future dangerousness is at issue, due process requires the
inmate be permitted to inform the jury of his ineligibility for
parole.6" However, the Supreme Court held that O'Dell could
not take advantage of the Simmons decision because it was a
"new rule" under Teague." Thus, despite the unconstitution-
ality of the imposition of O'Dell's sentence, Teague prevented
the consideration of O'Dell's claim, and he was later exe-
61. LAZARUS, supra note 27, at 501.
62. O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997).
63. See id. at 154.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 157.
67. See id. at 154-55.
68. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994).
69. See O'Dell, 521 U.S. at 166.
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cuted.7°
2. The New, Harsher Harmless Error Standard
Those inmates who are not "Teagued-out" still likely face
tremendous difficulty in obtaining habeas relief as a result of
the Rehnquist Court's decision altering the harmless error
standard in Brecht v. Abrahamson.7' Prior to Brecht, the Su-
preme Court would not reverse a constitutional error if the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.72
In Brecht, the prosecutor used a criminal defendant's
post-arrest silence to impeach him at trial.73 The defendant
appealed on the ground that the use of his post-arrest silence
violated due process.74 The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed
that the prosecution violated the defendant's rights by using
his post-arrest silence to impeach him,75 however, the court
held that the error "was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."76 The defendant then filed a habeas petition in fed-
eral court.77 The Supreme Court agreed that the defendant's
rights were violated,78 but adopted a new, more onerous,
harmless error standard for habeas review of constitutional
error. Under this new standard, a habeas petitioner alleging
constitutional error must demonstrate that the error "had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict."79 The new standard requires that the ha-
beas petitioner demonstrate actual prejudice, rather than
merely some harm, as a result of the constitutional error. In
Brecht, the Court held that the defendant was unable to meet
this new standard and affirmed his conviction."
70. See Man Executed Despite Protest From the Pope, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
1997, at A18.
71. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
72. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
73. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 625.
74. See id. at 625-26.
75. See id. at 626.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 628-29 ("[Tlhe State's references to petitioner's silence...
crossed the Doyle line."). See generally Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (es-
tablishing the principle that a defendant's post-Miranda silence cannot be used
for impeachment purposes).
79. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
776 (1946)).
80. See id. at 638-39.
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Brecht represents yet another hurdle to relief for death
row inmates. Even if an inmate convinces a court that
Teague does not bar his habeas claims, the new harmless er-
ror standard makes obtaining relief difficult. As two com-
mentators noted, when determining whether constitutional
error is harmless, the courts simply:
scrutinize the whole record for other overwhelming evi-
dence of guilt; if it exists, then the admitted error is
deemed harmless, because the court (not the jury) finds
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of the effect of
the error on the jury. The reviewing court has become in
effect, a super jury.81
The same commentators noted that the harmless error doc-
trine "raises troubling questions for a nation committed to
fair processes, meaningful review, and overriding constitu-
tional norms." 2
As recently as during the 1998-1999 term, the U.S. Su-
preme Court demonstrated the depths it will go to in order to
find a constitutional error harmless. In Strickler v. Greene,
the Court applied the harmless error principle to uphold the
death sentence of a Virginia inmate sentenced to death de-
spite the prosecution's suppression of important evidence.'
In Strickler, eyewitness testimony implicated the defendant
in the murder of a college student.84 According to the Court,
this testimony "provided the only disinterested, narrative ac-
count of what transpired."85 This testimony was so important
that the prosecutor emphasized it during closing arguments."
Prior to testifying at trial, however, the police interviewed the
eyewitness who was unable to positively identify the perpe-
trator at that time. The police and the boyfriend of the de-
ceased aided the witness' recollection at trial. The inter-
views where the police influenced the witness were not made
available to the defense until the federal habeas proceeding.
The Court held that the misconduct by the prosecutors did
81. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 22, at 7-8.
82. Id. at 7-11.
83. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
84. See id. at 295.
85. Id. at 311.
86. See id. at 307.
87. See id. at 296-98.
88. See id. at 316 (Souter, J., dissenting).
89. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 300.
[Vol. 40688
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not prejudice the defendant, although it conceded that the
outcome "might have changed" had the prosecution timely
disclosed the documents to the defense.9" As the dissenters
noted, if just one juror harbored doubts about the eyewit-
ness's account, the jury may not have rendered the death sen-
tence.91
3. Successor Habeas Petitions
The Rehnquist Court also created a hurdle for those in-
mates filing second or successor federal habeas petitions.
Second or successor petitions are necessary if the defendant
discovered new evidence after the filing of the earlier petition,
or the habeas attorney lacked hard evidence to support a
claim when filing the initial petition. While the Warren
Court opened the door to successor petitions in Sanders v.
United States,92 the Rehnquist Court almost completely shut
the door to these petitions. In McClesky v. Zant,93 the Court
adopted the same cause and prejudice test for successor peti-
tions that it adopted for procedural defaults under Wain-
right.94 Under McClesky, the Court only considers an in-
mate's successor petition if the defendant demonstrates (1)
cause for failing to raise the claim earlier, and (2) prejudice as
a result of the alleged constitutional violation.95 As with pro-
cedural default, this strict cause and prejudice standard for
successor petitions seriously impedes a death row inmate's
ability to receive habeas relief.
4. Limiting Evidentiary Hearings in Federal Court
Finally, the Rehnquist Court created a hurdle for those
inmates seeking evidentiary hearings in federal court. Death
row inmates frequently include factually disputable claims in
their habeas petitions.9" The petitioners need an opportunity
to fully develop these facts to accurately resolve the legal
claims, which may not be fully developed in state court. The
90. Id. at 307.
91 See id. at 318 (Souter, J., dissenting).
92. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); see also supra text accom-
panying note 43.
93. McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
94. See id. at 494; see also supra Part II.D.
95. See McClesky, 499 U.S. at 468.
96. Examples of factually disputable claims often raised are ineffective as-
sistance of counsel and claims of actual innocence.
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Warren Court "substantially increased the availability of evi-
dentiary hearings in habeas corpus proceedings and made
mandatory much of what had previously been within the
broad discretion of the District Court."9 7 However, in Keeney
v. Tamayo-Reyes," the Rehnquist Court applied the same
cause and prejudice test from the procedural default and suc-
cessor petition areas to determine whether to grant an inmate
an evidentiary hearing in federal court." Thus, an inmate
must demonstrate cause for failing to fully develop facts in




The cases decided by the Rehnquist Court, especially
Teague, substantially impaired death row inmates' ability to
obtain federal review of their death sentences. Congress
joined the Rehnquist Court in making it more difficult for
death row inmates to obtain federal habeas review when it
passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA").'0' The goal of the AEDPA is to restrain the fed-
eral courts' ability to review death sentences, since death row
inmates achieve a great deal of success having their convic-
tions and death sentences overturned in federal court. 2 The
97. Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122, 125 (1968).
98. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
99. See id. at 8.
100. See id. at 11.•
101. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241-
2266 (West Supp. 1999).
102. For instance, during the congressional debate, Representative Christo-
pher Cox stated:
My amendment, which I am calling the Harris amendment, provides
that a habeas writ will not be granted when State court decision rea-
sonably interprets and Federal law reasonably interprets the facts of
the case and reasonably applies the law to the facts, or to put it simply,
State decisions that are reasonable on the law and facts will be upheld
by a habeas review... Our Federal criminal jurisprudence is a gloss
on that State criminal justice system. The Federal procedural rules, in
fact, operate in many cases as a frustration to the State system. So we
find that there are egregious cases, and all too many of them, of con-
victed first degree murderers who have run all of their appeals in the
State criminal justice system, who then get another bite, and another
bite at the apple, seemingly endlessly in the Federal system, and who
have been able, through the abuse of the habeas device, to postpone
their executions, seemingly indefinitely....
141 CONG. REC. H1416 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox). Repre-
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key provisions of the Act serve to: (1) place strict time limita-
tions on filing a writ, (2) shift the balance of power to state
courts by requiring deference to its findings of facts and con-
clusions of law, (3) restrict the ability of inmates to file suc-
cessor habeas petitions, and (4) make it more difficult to ap-
103peal adverse district court decisions.
1. Placing Time Restrictions on Filing the Writ
Section 2244(d)(1) requires inmates to file federal habeas
petitions within one year of the latest of several events, most
typically the completion of direct review.0 However this time
period tolls while an inmate's state habeas petition is pend-
ing. °5 This new one year statute of limitations is problematic
for death row inmates because evidence of their innocence or
serious constitutional violations often surface many years af-
ter their convictions.' Furthermore, with the strict time
limit, habeas counsel may no longer have sufficient time to
investigate and develop their claims.
2. Deference to State Courts
Several provisions of the AEDPA require federal courts to
defer to state courts. This deference was adopted despite the
fact that the writ of habeas corpus exists to correct unconsti-
tutional state convictions. Thus, the very courts that may
have unconstitutionally convicted and sentenced an inmate
are now given great deference to recognize and correct their
mistakes.
First, section 2254(d)(1) provides that a federal court may
not reverse a state court's decision unless it "was contrary to,
sentative Bill McCollum added:
If there is a full and fair review of the provisions by the courts, the
Federal courts, of what is going on underneath, and if the lower courts
have made this decision, why should one Federal judge overturn the
rulings of the State court judge, five State intermediate appellate
courts and perhaps nine Supreme Court justices... ?
141 CONG. REC. H1425, 1426 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. McCol-
lum).
103. See 28 U.S.CA_ §§ 2241-2246.
104. See id. § 2244(d)(1).
105. See id. § 2244(d)(2).
106. For instance, after serving 16 years on death row, Anthony Porter was
released after a journalism class at Northwestern University located the real
killer. See John H. White & Brian Jackson, "I'm Free"; Wrongly Convicted of
Double Murder, Porter OffDeath Row, CI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 6, 1999, at 1.
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or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States.""7 One federal appeals court interpreted
this provision to require that federal courts honor a state
court's decision unless that decision is contrary to Supreme
Court precedent.' Therefore, if a state court decision on a
federal constitutional question conflicts with a federal ap-
peals court's interpretation of the same question, the state
court decision controls. As the Seventh Circuit explained:
Think of the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment,
which . . . does not prescribe a rule for "how long is too
long" but rather establishes a list of factors to consider.
The Supreme Court of the United States sets the bounds
of what is "reasonable"; a state decision within those lim-
its must be respected-not because it is right, or because
federal courts must abandon their independent decision
making, but because the grave remedy of upsetting a
judgement entered by another judicial system after full
litigation is reserved for grave occasions. 1
9
Second, the AEDPA makes significant changes in the
ability of an inmate to obtain a federal evidentiary hearing
during habeas proceedings. The state court's findings of fact
are presumed correct." ° Further, courts may grant an evi-
dentiary hearing only if an inmate's claim relies on a new
rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the U.S. Su-
preme Court,.. or if the claim relies on a factual predicate
that could not have been discovered earlier."' In addition, the
facts underlying the claim must "be sufficient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional er-
ror, no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense.""' As a result of this provi-
sion, only an inmate who makes a persuasive showing of fac-
tual innocence obtains a federal evidentiary hearing. Sup-
pose, for instance, that habeas counsel discovers evidence
that a death row inmate's trial counsel was romantically in-
volved with the prosecutor and may have divulged confiden-
107. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1).
108. See Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996).
109. Id. at 871.
110. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).
111. See id. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i).
112. See id. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii).
113. Id. § 2254(e)(2)(B).
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tial information about the inmate's case to the prosecutor.
This conflict may have rendered trial counsel ineffective.
Suppose further that habeas counsel includes an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in the habeas petition, but the
state court refuses to conduct an evidentiary hearing so that
habeas counsel could prove the claim. Under the AEDPA, the
inmate would not be granted an evidentiary hearing in fed-
eral court despite the fact that he did not receive a fair trial,
unless he also has evidence demonstrating his innocence.
This represents a major change from prior practice. Previ-
ously, federal courts had the discretion to conduct an eviden-
tiary hearing into any claim if the inmate demonstrated cause
and prejudice."'
Third, section 2254(b) mandates an exhaustion of state
remedies before filing a habeas petition in federal court."5
This is consistent with prior practice. However, two new pro-
visions depart from prior practice. First, the federal courts
may deny a claim on the merits despite an inmate's failure to
exhaust state remedies if the court believes the claim is non-
meritorious."' Second, the state must expressly waive the
exhaustion requirement." Thus, under the new law, when-
ever an inmate fails to exhaust state remedies, the state may
hope the federal court dismisses the claims.
3. Restricting Successor Habeas Petitions
The AEDPA also limits federal habeas review by severely
impairing an inmate's ability to file successor habeas peti-
tions. A successor petition is dismissed unless it is both new
and the inmate raises an issue of actual innocence that could
not have been discovered earlier through due diligence."'
Suppose, for instance, that after filing the initial writ, habeas
counsel comes across a videotape indicating a forced confes-
sion. The AEDPA prevents habeas counsel from filing a suc-
cessor petition unless he has additional evidence of his cli-
ent's innocence. The new evidence indicating a forced
114. See Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9 (1992); see also supra
Part III.E.4.
115. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b).
116. See id. § 2254(b)(2).
117. See id. § 2254(b)(3); see also Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987)
(holding that the exhaustion requirement is waived unless raised by the State).
118. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(b)(1), (b)(2)(B)(i-ii).
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confession in violation of the defendant's rights would not
permit counsel to file a successor petition as long as the evi-
dence pointing to the defendant's guilt was still strong. Fur-
thermore, an inmate must seek permission from the U.S.
Court of Appeals to file such a petition and the court of ap-
peals's decision is non-reviewable." 9  This provision likely
creates a dilemma for habeas counsel: if counsel knows of a
claim but cannot factually support it, is it better to include
the claim in the initial petition where dismissal is likely,20 or
is it better to exclude the claim and wait for further evidence
to support the claim while running the risk of an appeals
court not permitting a successor petition?
4. Difficulty in Appealing District Court Decisions
Finally, the AEDPA places limits on an inmate's ability
to appeal an adverse decision of a district court. Previously,
an inmate could appeal an adverse district court opinion as
long as the district court judge believed that at least one of
the inmate's claims warranted appellate consideration. 2'
Under the AEDPA, only a circuit justice or judge may issue a
certificate of appealability. 2 Further, only if the judge be-
lieves that the inmate "has made a substantial showing of a
constitutional right" may the judge issue the certificate of ap-
pealability.'23 These limitations on the ability to appeal an
adverse decision of a district court further hampers the ha-
beas process for death row inmates.
Collectively, the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and
the provisions of the AEDPA have eviscerated the writ of ha-
beas corpus." The federal courts will certainly no longer re-
119. See id. § 2244(b)(3)(A), (E).
120. It is also possible that an attorney may be sanctioned for filing such a
claim. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
12L See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44
BUFF. L. REv. 381, 390 (1996).
122. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(1). One commentator has found this change
"odd," since the district judge, having already examined the case, is in a better
position to determine its appealability. See Yackle, supra note 121, at 390.
123. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(2).
124. During congressional debate, Representative Mel Watt stated:
All of my colleagues and the American people are getting, if this
amendment passes, the Federal courts completely out of the habeas
business. You will not have any Federal habeas rights if this bill
passes, because in order for you to get in the Federal court, the Federal
court would have to find that a decision that was rendered in the State
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verse fifty percent of capital convictions. 125 Instead, elected
state judges, who are susceptible to political pressure, will re-
view death penalty cases. As a result of Teague,"
6 Brecht,127
and the tremendous deference given to state court determina-
tions of law and fact under the AEDPA, unconstitutional con-
victions and death sentences will stand. The lengthy appeals
process, although frustrating to the public, is important be-
cause this process reveals the innocence of many death row
inmates. It is likely that only those inmates who convinc-
ingly demonstrate their innocence early in the appeals proc-
ess will overcome the obstacles Congress and the Supreme
Court have placed before them.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
Death penalty regulation most appropriately occurs un-
der the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.'29 However,
the Supreme Court has failed to regulate the death penalty
under this provision. Specifically, the Supreme Court fails to
police the methods of execution, classes of individuals being
court was arbitrary or unreasonable interpretation of clearly estab-
lished Federal law, resulted in a decision that was based on an arbi-
trary and unreasonable application to the facts, resulted in a decision
that was based on an arbitrary and unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State proceeding.... So
the practical effect of what you are doing is to say that you are never
going to have any rights in the habeas arena in Federal court.
141 CONG. REC. H1426 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Watt). Rep-
resentative John Conyers remarked that '[this is probably the throwback
amendment to habeas corpus of all throwbacks. I mean, this would effectively
end habeas corpus today at the Federal level. It almost says that: Let each
State do their own thing on habeas corpus and forget Federal habeas review."
141 CONG. REC. H1425 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
125. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
126. See supra Part III.E.1.
127. See supra Part III.E.2.
128. Since 1963, at least 76 individuals have been wrongly convicted and sen-
tenced to death. For instance, James Richardson spent 21 years on Florida's
death row before being exonerated. See National Conference on Wrongful Con-
victions and the Death Penalty, The Wrongly Convicted (visited Oct. 20, 1998)
<http-J/www.ncwedp.com/wrongly.html>. Anthony Porter spent 16 years on Il-
linois' death row for a crime he didn't commit. See John Carpenter & Alex Rod-
riguez, 'Tm Free"; Wrongly Convicted of Double Murder, Porter Off Death Row,
Cm. TRIB., Feb. 6, 1999, at 1.
129. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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executed, and conditions of death row inmates. After ad-
dressing the constitutionalization of the death penalty, this
section addresses each of these areas individually.
A. Constitutionalizing Death
In Furman v. Georgia,3 ' a five-to-four majority of the Su-
preme Court held that capital punishment, as then adminis-
tered, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.' For three of the five jus-
tices in the majority, the fatal flaw with capital punishment
was the arbitrary and discriminatory manner of its imposi-
tion."' As for Justices Brennan and Marshall, they believed
that the death penalty was cruel and unusual under any cir-
cumstance. 3'
However, the Supreme Court subsequently reinstated the
death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia."T In doing so, it adopted
an agenda-oriented test, which in this case was designed to
permit the imposition of the death penalty. First, the Court
determined whether the death penalty offended "the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.""' In ascertaining these evolving standards of de-
cency, the Court looked to legislative enactments and jury
sentencing behavior."' Second, the Court held that the death
penalty must measurably contribute to the penological goals
of retribution and deterrence."7 Not surprisingly, the death
penalty met both elements of the Supreme Court's test.
B. All Methods of Execution Are Acceptable
The Supreme Court does not employ the Eighth Amend-
ment to regulate the manner in which executions are carried
out in the United States. During the 1999-2000 term, the
Supreme Court agreed, for the first time in over 100 years, 38
to decide the constitutionality of the electric chair as a
method of punishment. However, in response to the Court's
130. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
131. See id. at 238.
132. See id. at 242-43 (Douglas, J., concurring).
133. See id. at 305, 369 (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., concurring).
134. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
135. Id. at 169-77 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
136. See id. at 174 n.19, 181-82.
137. See id. at 183-87.
138. See generally In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
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action, Florida passed legislation providing inmates a choice
between death by lethal injection or by the electric chair. The
Court then dismissed the case as "moot."139 There are five
execution methods presently employed in the United States:
electrocution, lethal gas, hanging, firing squad, and lethal
injection."' Nine states use electrocution.' Electrocution in-
volves strapping an inmate to a chair with belts that cross the
chest, groin, legs, and arms.4 The inmate is first given a jolt
of electricity between 500 and 2000 volts, which lasts for ap-
proximately thirty seconds.' Additional volts are given if the
inmate is not dead.'" Newspaper accounts of two executions,
although occurring more than 100 years apart, are strikingly
similar in detail:
William Kemmler, August 6, 1890 (New York)
After the first convulsion there was not the slightest
movement of Kemmler's body .... Then the eyes that had
been momentarily turned from Kemmler's body returned
to it and gazed with horror on what they saw. The men
rose from their chairs impulsively and groaned at the ag-
ony they felt. "Great God! he is alive?" someone said;
"Turn on the current," said another ....
Again came that click as before, and again the body of
the unconscious wretch in the chair became as rigid as one
of bronze. It was awful, and the witnesses were so horri-
fied by the ghastly sight that they could not take their
eyes off it. The dynamo did not seem to run smoothly.
The current could be heard sharply snapping. Blood began
to appear on the face of the wretch in the chair. It stood
on the face like sweat ....
139. See Court Dismisses Challenge to Florida Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
25, 2000, at A21.
140. See Roberta M. Harding, The Gallows to the Gurney: Analyzing the(Un)constitutionality of the Methods of Execution, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 153, 163(1996).
141. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Nebraska, Ohio, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Virginia employ the electrocution method. See Deborah W.
Denno, Execution and the Forgotten Eighth Amendment, in AMERICA's
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 35, at 547, 553. However,
only Alabama, Georgia, and Nebraska use it exclusively. See Court Dismisses
Challenge to Florida Executions, supra note 139.
142. See Jacob Weisberg, This Is Your Death, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 1,
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An awful odor began to permeate the death chamber,
and then, as though to cap the climax of this fearful sight,
it was seen that the hair under and around the electrode
on the head and the flesh under and around the electrode
at the base of the spine was singeing. The stench was un-
bearable.
Pedro Medina, March 25, 1997 (Florida)
"Immediately" after the executioner applied the electricity,
Medina "lurched backward into the chair and balled his
hands into fists" while his mask "burst into flames." Ac-
cording to witnesses, "[bllue and orange flames up to a foot
long shot from the right side of Mr. Medina's head and
flickered for [six] to [ten] seconds, filling the execution
chamber with smoke." The "smell of burnt flesh filled the
witness room." Four minutes later, Medina was pro-
nounced dead. Corrections Department spokeswoman
Kerry Flack explained that "a maintenance supervisor
wearing electrical gloves patted out the flames while an-
other official opened a window to disperse the smoke."
Witnesses described the scene as "ghastly." Others
claimed they were "nauseated by the sight and the smell."
"It was horrible. A solid flame covered his whole head
from one side to the other. I had the impression of some-
body being burned alive," stated one witness.
141
Three states employ lethal gas.146 An inmate in a lethal
gas state is fastened into a metal chair in a room with a
sealed door.' A bowl filled with a mixture of sulfuric acid,
distilled water, and one pound of cyanide pellets is below the
chair. "[A]n executioner in a separate room flicks a lever
that releases the cyanide into the liquid."' Hydrogen cya-
nide gas is released through the holes in the chair.' "At first
there is evidence of extreme horror, pain, and strangling. The
eyes pop. The skin turns purple and the victim begins to
drool."'5' It has been described as a "horrible sight.""
2 The
victim stops wriggling after ten or twelve minutes, at which
145. Denno, supra note 141, at 547-48.
146. California, Missouri, and North Carolina utilize the lethal gas method.
See id. at 553.







2000] DEREGULATING THE DEATH PENALTY
time the doctor pronounces him dead.15
Three states employ hanging, the oldest of the five execu-
tion methods."" The inmate is blindfolded and placed on top
of a trap door with a rope fastened around his neck. 5 ' The
trap door is then opened, causing the body to fall through.'56
As a result, the upper cervical vertebrae dislocates and the
spinal cord separates from the brain, causing death.'57 Death
can take as long as ten minutes.5 8
Idaho and Utah employ the firing squad.5 ' A doctor lo-
cates the inmate's heart.' A circular white cloth target is
placed over it.' 6 ' "Five shooters, armed with .30-caliber rifles
loaded with single rounds (one of them blank to spare the
conscience of the executioners)," fire into the inmate's heart.'62
Death occurs in about two minutes, unless the shooters miss
the heart, whereupon the inmate bleeds to death."
Finally, twenty-nine jurisdictions employ lethal injec-
tion.' Lethal injection is the preferred method of execution
because it is deemed the most humane.'65 An inmate is in-
jected with three chemicals: sodium thiopental, pavulon, and
potassium chloride. 66 Despite its popularity, there have been
more botched lethal injections since 1976 than any other
method of execution.'67 Problems with lethal injections in-
clude difficulty in locating veins and improper administration
of the chemicals.'68 A botched injection can cause prolonged
suffering.
169
153. See Weisberg, supra note 142, at 26.
154. See Denno, supra note 141, at 553.
155. See Weisberg, supra note 142, at 23.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 24.
158. See id.
159. See Denno, supra note 141, at 553.




164. See Harding, supra note 140, at 177-78.
165. See Weisberg, supra note 142, at 27.
166. See id.
167. Since 1976, 23 lethal injections have been botched, compared to 18 elec-
trocutions, and eight lethal gas executions. See Denno, supra note 141, at 572-
76.
168. See id. at 563-64.
169. For an exhaustive list of botched executions since 1982, see Denno, su-
pra note 141, at 572-76.
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Electrocution, lethal gas, hanging, and firing squads ap-
pear to violate the Supreme Court's "evolving standards of
decency" standard. Most states moved from these methods
toward lethal injection because it is considered more hu-
mane.17 In contrast, no state has moved from lethal injection
to another method of execution.171 Therefore, there appears to
be a national consensus rejecting all methods of execution ex-
cept lethal injection."2 Nevertheless, each method, including
lethal injection, appears constitutionally suspect since none
produces "instantaneous, and, therefore, painless, death."
1 73
However, the Supreme Court refuses to address the is-
sue. Since 1976, the Court has taken a broad view of the
Eighth Amendment, prohibiting the use of excessive force by
prison officials, 74 requiring prison officials to provide medical
treatment,1 75 and recognizing a duty among prison officials to
protect inmates from inmate-against-inmate violence.
176
However, during this same period, the Court has not ren-
dered a decision in a single case challenging a method of exe-
cution.7 7 Why has the Court prohibited mistreatment of in-
mates by prison officials yet permitted these same officials to
inflict death in a painful, barbaric fashion? The Court's
treatment of this issue again demonstrates its political
agenda in favor of the death penalty. The Court does not ap-
ply its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to the methods of
execution because no method of execution is constitutional.
Instead, the Court avoids the issue by simply denying certio-
rari.
170. See id. at 560.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 561.
173. In re Kenunler, 136 U.S. 436, 443 (1890).
174. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992).
175. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
176. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
177. The Court did grant certiorari in a case challenging Florida's use of the
electric chair. However, after the Florida legislature passed legislation provid-
ing for death by lethal injection, unless an inmate preferred the chair, the Court
dismissed the challenge as moot. See Court Dismisses Challenge to Florida Exe-
cutions, supra note 139, at A18. Furthermore, after the Ninth Circuit held Cali-
fornia's former statute authorizing execution by lethal gas unconstitutionally
cruel and unusual, see Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996), the Su-
preme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision, see Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S.
918 (1996).
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C. Executing Kids and the Mentally Retarded
The Supreme Court refuses to regulate the classes of in-
dividuals susceptible to the death penalty."8 In 1989, the
U.S. Supreme Court found no Eighth Amendment violation
when the state executed offenders who were sixteen or seven-
teen years old at the time of their offense."' By permitting
the execution of sixteen and seventeen year-old offenders, the
Court failed to apply its own Eighth Amendment "evolving
standards" doctrine. The Court permitted the execution of
sixteen and seventeen year-old offenders despite the fact that
a majority of states do not permit such executions.18 In addi-
tion, only one year earlier, the Court held that the execution
of a fifteen year-old offender makes no "measurable contribu-
tion to the goals that capital punishment is intended to
achieve." 8' Moreover, the Court specifically refused to con-
sider the tremendous international condemnation of execut-
ing juveniles 82 in determining whether the practice offended
178. The Court did prohibit the execution of the insane in Ford v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
179. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
180. See Mark Warren, Death Penalty Information Center (visited Jan. 14,
1999) <http'//www.essential.org/dpicforeignnatl.html>. Twelve states and the
District of Columbia do not allow the imposition of the death penalty at all
(Alaska, Hawaii, North Dakota, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Michigan, West
Virginia, Maine, Vermont, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts). See id. Fourteen
states and the Federal Government do not permit the execution of individuals
under eighteen (California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and
Washington). See id.
181. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (finding that retribu-
tion was not appropriate for juveniles "given the lesser culpability of the juve-
nile offender, the teenager's capacity for growth, and society's fiduciary obliga-
tions to its children"). Furthermore, it found the deterrent rationale
unacceptable for juvenile offenders:
The likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-
benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution
is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent. And, even if one posits such
a cold-blooded calculation by a 15 year-old, it is fanciful to believe that
he would be deterred by the knowledge that a small number of persons
his age have been executed during the 20th century.
Id. at 838.
182. Numerous international treaties prohibit the execution of offenders
younger than 18. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 37(a), U.N. Doc. A1441736 (1989) ("Neither capital
punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be im-
posed for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age."); Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 6(5), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 ("Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by
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evolving standards of decency.183
In Penry v. Lynaugh,7 the Supreme Court refused to
prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded.185 Again,
whether the execution of mentally retarded individuals com-
ports with the Eighth Amendment is highly questionable,
given the fact that a majority of Americans do not support
such executions.'86 In addition, it is highly doubtful that men-
tally retarded individuals can be deterred or can appreciate
the purpose of their punishment. Permitting the execution of
juveniles and the mentally retarded exemplifies the Supreme
Court's failure to regulate capital punishment.
persons below eighteen years of age...."); American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 4(5), 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 ("Capital Punishment shall
not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime was committed, were
under 18 years of age... ."); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 68, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, re-
printed in INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF
AUGUST 12 1949, at 179 (1997) (Fourth Geneva Convention) ("In any case, the
death penalty may not be pronounced on a protected person who was under
eighteen years of age at the time of the offense."); Protocol Additional to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 10, 1977, art. 77(5), 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, PROTOCOLS
ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 95 (1977)
("The death penalty for an offence related to the armed conflict shall not be exe-
cuted on persons who had not attained the age of eighteen years at the time the
offence was committed."); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Dec. 7, 1978, art. 6(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, re-
printed in INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 95 (1977) ("The death penalty
shall not be pronounced on persons who were under the age of eighteen at the
time of the offence .... "). In addition, since 1985, only Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Yemen have executed
juvenile offenders. See Amnesty International, Juveniles and the Death Pen-
alty; Executions Worldwide Since 1985 (visited Mar. 15, 2000)
<http.//www.anmesty.orgailib/aipub/1998/SM/A5000 2 98.htm>.
183. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 n.1 ("We emphasize that it is American
conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petition-
ers and their various amici that the sentencing practices of other countries are
relevant ....").
184. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
185. See id.
186. See Victor L. Streib, Executing Women, Children, and the Retarded: Sec-
ond Class Citizens, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, su-
pra note 35, at 215, 218.
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D. No Confinement Is Too Long
Another Eighth Amendment issue the Court ignores and
refuses to regulate is "the death row phenomenon."'87 The
"death row phenomenon" constitutes the inordinate delay in
carrying out an execution, resulting in an inmate suffering
extreme psychological trauma.'88 The psychological trauma
such an inmate suffers has been described as follows:
From the moment he enters the condemned cell, the pris-
oner is enmeshed in a dehumanizing environment of near
hopelessness. He is in a place where the sole object is to
preserve his life so that he may be executed. The con-
demned prisoner is "the living dead."... Throughout all
this time the condemned prisoner constantly broods over
his fate.... The horrifying specter of being [executed] is,
if at all, never far from mind.8 9
Although some amount of suffering is perhaps an inci-
dental part of processing a condemned inmate's appeals prior
to carrying out an execution, such suffering becomes unneces-
sary-and possibly unconstitutional-when state actors cause
a substantial, unwarranted delay.' Such long-term gratui-
tous suffering becomes a separate form of punishment, which
may be equivalent to or greater than the actual execution.'
187. The European Court of Human Rights used the term to describe the
length of time spent on death row due to the United States appeal system. See
Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 464 (1989).
188. See id. at 474.
189. Catholic Com'n for Justice & Peace in Zimb. v. Attorney Gen., No. S.C.
73/93 (Zimb. June 24, 1993) (reported in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 323 (1993)).
190. See, e.g., Elledge v. Florida, 119 S. Ct. 366 (1998) (mem.). A Florida
death row inmate spent more than 23 years in prison, his successful appeals ac-
counting for 18 of the 23 years and a fourth appeal-unsuccessful because of a
four-to-two vote of the Florida Supreme Court-accounting for the other five
years. In fact, Florida conceded that "all delays were a result of [petitioner's]
'successful litigation' in the appellate courts of Florida and the federal system."
Id. at 366.
191. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109, 112 (1983) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) ("The argument so often advanced by the dissenters that capital
punishment is cruel and unusual is dwarfed by the cruelty of 10 years on death
row inflicted upon this guilty defendant by his lawyers seeking to turn the ad-
ministration of justice into the sporting contest that Roscoe Pound denounced
three-quarters of a century ago."); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
288-89 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Wie know that mental pain is an in-
separable part of our practice of punishing criminals by death, for the prospect
of pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the inevitable long wait be-
tween the imposition of sentence and the actual infliction of death."); id. at 382
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The practice of forcing a condemned man to wait an inor-
dinate amount of time before execution was condemned by
English common law. In 1752, the English Parliament en-
acted the "Act for better preventing the horrid Crime of Mur-
der," which provided that all persons convicted of murder
should be executed two days after sentencing.
192
Common law in America followed the English common
law practice of swift executions. Colonial New York, for ex-
ample, executed convicted felons within a few days of sen-
tencing.1 93 Similarly, in colonial New England, "[c]apital of-
fenders were put to death without moral qualms, but they
were dispatched swiftly without unnecessary suffering."94
Many framers shared this view. Thomas Jefferson wrote that
"whenever sentence of death shall have been pronounced
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[A] man awaiting execution must inevitably experi-
ence extraordinary mental anguish. . . ."); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880
(Cal. 1972) ("Penologists and medical experts agree that the [protracted] process
of carrying out a verdict of death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the
human spirit as to constitute psychological torture."); Commonwealth v. O'Neal,
339 N.E.2d 676, 680-81 (Mass. 1975) (Tauro, C.J., concurring) ("The convicted
felon suffers extreme anguish in anticipation of the extinction of his existence.");
Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 209-11 (Wyo. 1981) (Rose, C.J., dissenting in
part) (recognizing "the dehumanizing effects of long imprisonment pending exe-
cution"); Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 348, 353 (India)
(criticizing the "dehumanizing character of the delay" in carrying out an execu-
tion).
Similar views have been expressed by mental health experts. See, e.g.,
ALBERT CAMUS, REFLECTIONS ON THE GUILLOTINE, RESISTANCE, REBELLION &
DEATH 205 (1966) ("As a general rule, a man is undone waiting for capital pun-
ishment well before he dies."); see also DUFFY & HIRSHBERG, EIGHTY-EIGHT
MEN AND TWO WOMEN 254 (1962) ("One night on death row is too long, and the
length of time spent there by [some inmates] constitutes cruelty that defies the
imagination. It has always been a source of wonder to me that they didn't all go
stark, raving mad."); Robert Johnson, Under Sentence of Death: The Psychology
of Death Row Confinement, 5 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 141, 157-60 (1979); Rich-
ard Stafer, Symposium on Death Penalty Issues: Volunteering for Execution, 74
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 861 & n.10 (1983) (citing studies); Louis
Jolyun West, Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty, 45 AMER. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 689, 694-95 (1975); Barbara A. Wood, Competency for Exe-
cution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 37-39 (1986)
("The physical and psychological pressure besetting capital inmates has been
widely noted ... courts and commentators have argued that the extreme psy-
chological stress accompanying death row confinement is an eighth amendment
violation in itself ....").
192. See The Murder Act, 1751, 25 Geo. 2, ch. 37 (Eng.).
193. See PHILIP ENGLISH MACKEY, HANGING IN THE BALANCE: THE ANTI-
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK STATE 17,20 (1982).
194 EDJAR J. MCMANUS, LAW AND LIBERTY IN EARLY NEW ENGLAND 182
(1993).
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against any person for treason or murder, execution shall be
done on the next day but one after such sentence, unless it be
Sunday, and then on the Monday following."'95 In a 1777 let-
ter, George Washington stated that the execution of a soldier
"better be done quickly and in a public manner as possible."'96
Chief Justice John Marshall stated in response to a clemency
petition:
[I]t is a consideration of some weight with [the under-
signed petitioners], that the prisoner hath languished a
long time [from April to September 17931 in jail [awaiting
execution], in a situation which must have added to the
miseries [sic] of imprisonment, & the horrors of execution,
which agony alone hath suspended.
1 97
Finally, Supreme Court Justice James Wilson, another lead-
ing framer, wrote:
The principles both of utility and of justice require, that
the commission of a crime should be followed by speedy in-
fliction of the punishment.
After conviction, the punishment assigned to an inferior
offen[s]e should be inflicted with much expedition. This
will strengthen the useful association between them; one
appearing as the immediate and unavoidable consequence
of the other. When a sentence of death is pronounced,
such an interval should be permitted to elapse before its
execution, as will render the language of political expedi-
ency consonant to the language of religion.
Under these qualifications, the speedy punishment
should form a part of every system of criminal jurispru-
dence.'98
Foreign tribunals have also addressed this issue. Several
international tribunals declare that extended confinements
195. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR PROPORTIONING CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTS (1779), reprinted in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 90, 95 (S. Pado-
ver ed. 1943).
196. Letter to Colonel George Gibson, March 11, 1778, vol. XI, in THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES
1745-99 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1931-44).
197. THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL (Herbert A. Johnson ed., Univ. Va.
Press 1977).
198. ROBERT GREEN MCCLOSKEY, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON VOL. II
628-30 (1967).
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on death row are cruel and unusual punishment.199 Most no-
tably, the British Privy Council-the highest judicial body in
the United Kingdom-concluded that forcing a condemned
man to wait many years between sentencing at trial and ac-
tual execution was "cruel and unusual punishment.""0 In ad-
dition, the European Court of Human Rights refused to ex-
tradite a capital murder defendant to Virginia because of the
risk of delay before execution. 0'
Despite these condemnations of the "death row phe-
nomenon," the U.S. Supreme Court refuses to address the is-
sue of whether delay in carrying out an execution is cruel and
unusual punishment.2 The Court's refusal to address the is-
sue continues in spite of the fact that the Framers did not tol-
erate such delays at the time of adopting the Bill of Rights, as
discussed earlier, and therefore, the practice violates the
Eighth Amendment.0 3 In addition, the Court's refusal to ad-
dress the "death row phenomenon" contrasts the seriousness
with which foreign jurisdictions treat the issue. Failure to
recognize the "death row phenomenon" and to consider inter-
national developments0 4 again demonstrates the Supreme
Court's willingness to deregulate the death penalty.
199. See, e.g., Pratt v. Attorney Gen. for Jam., 4 All E.R. 769 (P.C. 1993) (en
banc); Catholic Comm'n for Justice & Peace in Zimb. v. Attorney Gen., No. S.C.
73/93 (Zimb. June 24, 1993) (reported in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 323 (1993)); State v.
Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (SA).
200. See Pratt, 4 All E.R. at 788-89.
201. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 439 (1989).
202. Several inmates have raised the issue in petitions to the Supreme Court,
but certiorari has been denied in each. See, e.g., Elledge v. Florida, - U.S. _
119 S. Ct. 366 (1998) (mem.); White v. Johnson, 519 U.S. 911 (1996); Lackey v.
Johnson, 519 U.S. 911 (1996). However, Justices Breyer and Stevens have rec-
ognized the importance of the issue and have dissented from the denial of cer-
tiorari. See Elledge, 119 S. Ct. at 366 (Breyer, & Stevens, JJ. dissenting) ("Peti-
tioner in this case has spent more than 23 years in prison under sentence of
death. His claim-that the Constitution forbids his execution after a delay of
this length-is a serious one."); Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918, 919 (1996)
(Breyer, & Stevens, JJ. dissenting) ("[T1he Court has exhibited a callous indif-
ference to these concerns.. . ."). Lower courts have ruled that the issue pres-
ents a new claim and is therefore barred by Teague v. Lane. See, e.g., White v.
Johnson 79 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1996), rehg denied, 85 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. 1996).
203. "There is little room for doubt that the Eighth Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment embraces, at a minimum, those modes of pun-
ishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of
Rights was adopted." Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986). See also
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 330 (1989).
20i See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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V. RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY
Deregulation of the death penalty occurs despite over-
whelming evidence that the imposition is racially discrimina-
tory. No other area of American society permits the blatant
racism found in the capital punishment system. Overtly rac-
ist statements have been made during death penalty pro-
ceedings by trial judges,"' prosecutors,"' and defense coun-
sel0 7 with impunity. Evidence that jurors impermissibly
considered race in imposing the death penalty has also been
disregarded."8
The U.S. Supreme Court has confronted the issue of ra-
cism in the imposition of the death penalty in two contexts:
sentencing and jury selection. First, despite the fact that ap-
proximately half of the homicide victims in the United States
are African-American," 9 most of their killers do not receive
the death penalty. Rather, in approximately eighty-three
percent of the cases resulting in death sentences the victim
was white.21 Furthermore, the General Accounting Office
summarized its analysis of twenty-eight death penalty stud-
ies as follows:
In [eighty-two] percent of the studies, race of the victim
was found to influence the likelihood of being charged
with capital murder or receiving the death penalty, i.e.,
those who murdered whites were found to be more likely
to be sentenced to death than those who murdered blacks.
This finding was remarkably consistent across data sets,
205. See, e.g., Dobbs v. Zant, 720 F. Supp. 1566, 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1989), affd,
963 F.2d 1403 (l1th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 506 U.S. 357 (1993) ("Defendant referred
to by trial judge as colored."); Peek v. Florida, 488 So. 2d 52, 56 (Fla. 1986) (ac-
knowledging that the trial judge referred to parents of an African-American de-
fendant as the "nigger mom and dad").
206. See Dobbs, 720 F. Supp. at 1578.
207. See id; see also Goodwin v. Balkom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 n.13 (11th Cir.
1982) (recognizing that defense counsel called defendant "a little old nigger boy"
during closing argument); Dungee v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985), de-
cided sub nom. Issacs v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1164 (1986) (stating that the five African-American defendants were re-
ferred to as "niggers" by defense counsel during trial).
208. See, e.g., Spencer v. State, 398 S.E.2d 179, 184-85 (Ga. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 500 U.S. 960 (1991) (identifying that jurors used racial slurs during their
deliberations).
209. See Erik Eckholm, Studies Find Death Penalty often Tied to Victim's
Race, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1995, at Al.
210. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, DEATH ROW U.S.A. 1
(1997).
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states, data collection methods, and analytic techniques. 211
In McCleskey v. Kemp,"2 the defendant presented the Su-
preme Court with a highly reliable statistical study indicating
that "after taking into account some 230 nonracial factors
that might legitimately influence a sentencer, the jury more
likely than not would have spared [the defendant's] life had
his victim been black."2 M3 This study determined that "blacks
who kill whites are sentenced to death at nearly [twenty-two]
times the rate of blacks who kill blacks."24 Despite the over-
whelming evidence that race plays a significant role in de-
termining who receives death sentences, the Supreme Court
found that the study failed to establish a prima facie case of
racial discrimination.215 The Court claimed the study estab-
lished "at most.., a discrepancy that appears to correlate
with race.""6 In addition, the Court adopted a crippling stan-
dard of proof that required the petitioner to present evidence
that the decision-makers in his particular case acted with a
discriminatory purpose. 21' As a result of the McCleskey stan-
dard, many state and federal courts deny hearings when pre-
sented with evidence of gross racial disparities.218
Criticism of the McClesky decision has been wide-
spread.219 Although the McClesky Court insisted on a showing
of discriminatory purpose, this requirement has not been uni-
formly applied in other contexts. For instance, in voting
211. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING:
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (1990).
212. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
213. Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
214. Id. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
215. See id. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 312-13.
217. See id. at 292.
218. See Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance
of Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 433, 463, 474-75 (1995) [hereinafter Bright, Discrimination, Death and
Denial].
219. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good
Intentions with Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593,
1602-03 (1994); see also S. GROSS & R. MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION:
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1988); Bright, Discrimination,
Death and Denial, supra note 218, at 433; Sherri L. Johnson, Unconscious Ra-
cism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988); Randall Kennedy,
McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment and the Supreme Court, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term: Leading Cases, 101
HARV. L. REV. 119, 155-59 (1987); Hugo A. Bedau, Someday McClesky Will Be
Death Penalty's Dred Scott, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1987, § 2, at 5.
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rights cases, where white plaintiffs challenge minority-
majority districts, the white challengers are not required to
show discriminatory purpose.22 Instead, the challengers may
state an equal protection claim by alleging that the shape of
the district along with its racial makeup, "cannot be under-
stood as anything other than" a distinction based upon race.221
Yet, when confronted with the powerful and unrefuted
McClesky statistics, which also "cannot be understood as any-
thing other than" a distinction based upon race,222 the Court
required a showing of discriminatory purpose. This led the
late Judge A. Leon Higgonbatham to conclude that the
Court's decision making "lacks any principled basis under its
equal protection precedent."" Thus, under its equal protec-
tion jurisprudence, the Court is willing to infer discrimination
from the shape of a congressional district and its racial
makeup, but not from the powerful and unrefuted statistics
presented to it in McClesky.
Why the differences in application of the equal protection
clause? This article posits that the different application re-
flects the politics of the Court. On the one hand, the Court
does not require a showing of discriminatory purpose in
challenges to minority-majority congressional districts be-
cause it looks favorably upon these challenges. On the other
hand, the Court requires death row inmates to show dis-
criminatory purpose in order to continue to find the death
penalty constitutional despite its serious flaws.
Second, prosecutors disproportionately remove African-
Americans from capital juries because juries with African-
American members are less likely to render death sen-
tences.224 Prosecutors struck as many as twenty-six African-
American prospective jurors in one case.2" Evidence reveals
that some prosecutors have a policy to routinely strike Afri-
can-Americans from capital juries.226 Excluding African-
220. See Higginbotham et al., supra note 219, at 1602-03.
221 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993).
222. Id.
223. Higginbotham et al., supra note 219, at 1603.
224. See Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial, supra note 218, at 458.
225. See id. at 448.
226. For instance, a videotape was disclosed during the 1997 campaign for
Philadelphia District Attorney in which the Republican candidate, while work-
ing as an assistant prosecutor, advised young prosecutors to avoid picking
blacks from low-income areas to sit on juries. See L. Stuart Ditzen et al., To
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Americans from juries occurs despite the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Batson v. Kentucky,227 which purports to make it
easier to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in jury
selection.22 However, Batson fails because the Court put no
teeth into the decision. Courts routinely accept any justifica-
tion offered by the prosecution for striking African-
Americans, thus denying any discrimination claim under Bat-
son." In Tompkins v. Texas,"0 the Court denied an opportu-
nity to strengthen the principles of Batson by requiring trial
judges to examine a prosecutor's motive in exercising its per-
emptory challenges.
Collectively, McCleskey and Batson demonstrate the
Court's political agenda in favor of the death penalty. The
statistics presented to the Court in McClesky were so over-
whelning that in order to seriously confront them, the Court
would have been forced to strike down the death penalty.
Similarly, if the Court put teeth into Batson, the widespread
practice of excluding African-Americans from juries would
cease. Therefore, juries would be more racially diverse,
probably resulting in fewer death sentences.
VI. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Supreme Court also fails to regulate the quality of
counsel appointed to represent death row inmates.
Win, Limit Black Jurors, McMahon Said, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, April 1,
1997, at Al. An Alabama federal court found that the "standard operating pro-
cedure of the Tuscaloosa County District Attorney's Office ... was to use the
peremptory challenges to strike as many blacks as possible from venires in
cases involving serious crimes." Jackson v. Thigpen, 752 F. Supp. 1551, 1554
(N.D. Ala. 1990), rev'd in part and affd in part sub nom. Jackson v. Herring, 42
F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1995). Prosecutors in the Harris County (Texas) District
Attorney's Office have remarked that race is "something you have to look at"
during jury selection. LAZARUS, supra note 27, at 58. Finally, between 1974
and 1994, the District Attorney for the Ocmulgee Judicial Circuit in Georgia,
Joseph Briley, used 94% of his jury challenges in cases involving black defen-
dants and white victims against African-Americans. See Horton v. Zant, 941
F.2d 1449, 1458 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 952 (1992).
227. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
228. See id. (holding that a prima facie case of racial discrimination could be
established by disparate strikes against minority jurors in a particular case).
229. For an excellent illustration, see LAZARUS, supra note 27, at 52-60.
230. Tompkins v. Texas, 490 U.S. 754 (1989). For an inside perspective on
the politics behind the Court's denial of certiorari in Tompkins, see LAZARUS,
supra note 27, at 60-73.
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A. No Standards to Ensure Effective Assistance
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quires that before certifying a class action lawsuit, the court
must scrutinize trial counsel . ' Trial counsel must be suffi-
ciently skillful to handle the case and free of any conflicts of
interest that would hamper the representation. 2 In addition,
counsel is paid either a percentage of the amount awarded to
the class or his normal hourly rate, adjusted upward in the
event of special risks, novelty of the issues, and the like.233
Courts ensure adequacy of counsel not to protect a constitu-
tional right, but rather to protect the rights of class members.
In contrast to class action lawyers, counsel for death row
inmates, whose lives are at stake and who possess a constitu-
tional right to counsel,' typically do not receive similar scru-
tiny. Insufficiently skilled counsel is often appointed. For
example, counsel for a death row inmate in Georgia could
only name one criminal law decision from any court." Fur-
ther, it is not unusual for appointed counsel to have serious
conflicts of interest." Finally, the compensation for court ap-
pointed attorneys is so inadequate in most states that, to per-
form competently, counsel must work for less than minimum
wage.
237
231. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
232. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIvIL PROCEDURE 968 (4th ed. 1996).
233. See id. at 2001.
234. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defence."); see
also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (applying the right to counsel to
the states).
235. See Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 29, at 1839. Justice Thur-
good Marshall remarked that "capital defendants frequently suffer the conse-
quences of having trial counsel who are ill equipped to handle capital cases."
Thurgood Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty Made at the Judicial Confer-
ence of the Second Circuit, 86 COLuAi. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1986). See also David R.
Dow, The State, The Death Penalty, and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L. REV. 691, 694
(1996) (describing the representation of Carl Johnson by trial counsel who was
"less than a year out of law school who had never previously tried a capital
case").
236. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
237. In Alabama, trial counsel is paid $40 per hour for in-court work, $20 per
hour for out-of court work. Counsel is limited to $1000 maximum for work done
out of court. See ALA. CODE § 15-12-21 (Supp. 1999). In Delaware, counsel is
paid $50 per hour, but can only earn a maximum of $2000. See DEL. SUPER. CT.
R. CRIM. P. 44 (West Supp. 1999). In Florida, counsel is limited to $3500. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.036 (West Supp. 1999). In Mississippi, the limit is
$1000. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-15-17 (1994).
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The Supreme Court is directly responsible for the poor
quality of representation death row inmates receive. To es-
tablish inadequate representation, a defendant must show
that his attorney's performance was unreasonable under the
prevailing professional standards and that this performance
prejudiced the defense. 8 Defendants usually cannot prevail
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because courts
find either that counsel's actions or inactions were strategic
decisions, or that the defendant was not prejudiced by the de-
cision since the evidence against him was so overwhelming.
This standard, announced in Strickland v. Washington,
makes a mockery of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
because it fails to develop minimal standards of representa-
tion. For instance, to satisfy the Sixth Amendment, the Court
could have required counsel to conduct a reasonable investi-
gation and be free from conflicts of interest. Competent coun-
sel always makes a difference, if not in obtaining an acquittal,
in obtaining a sentence less than death." Certainly, if regu-
lation of the adequacy of counsel in civil class actions occurs,
standards ensuring that a capital defendant receives more
than a warm body at trial is appropriate. As one commenta-
tor remarked:
The Supreme Court's failure is that its definition is so
vague that it merely enables courts to do as they please,
whether it is to rarely declare a lawyer ineffective or
commonly declare the lawyer effective. Armed with this
definition, a fact finder-a judge-can render, with justifi-
cation, virtually any finding of effectiveness. The defini-
tion is so imprecise, or so fluid, that it allows courts to
achieve the agenda of choice-whether the court wants to
declare a lawyer ineffective or effective. Usually, the court
finds the lawyer to be effective since few judges want to
incur the wrath of the community by giving a defendant a
new trial. That doesn't seem right. The law should be
238. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984).
239. See Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., con-
curring).
The Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, does not require that
the accused, even in a capital case, be represented by able or effective
counsel .... Consequently, accused persons who are represented by
"not-legally-ineffective" lawyers may be condemned to die when the
same accused, if represented by effective counsel, would receive at least
the clemency of a life sentence.
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more precise.
As a result of the Supreme Court's failure to develop
more precise standards to determine effectiveness of counsel,
lawyers who slept through parts of trials,24' used racial slurs
to refer to their clients,2 conducted cross-examination with-
out being present for the direct, 3 filed appeal briefs consist-
ing of one page of argument,' and were intoxicated during
trial," were not rendered ineffective. At a minimum, the Su-
preme Court should develop a standard that ensures that ap-
pointed counsel is sufficiently experienced to handle capital
cases, free of conflicts, and adequately compensated.u6
240. Greta Van Susteren, Responsibility of a Criminal Defense Attorney, 30
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 125, 127 (1996).
241. The trial judge in George McFarland's capital murder trial, when asked
to comment on reports that defense counsel slept during parts of the trial,
stated, 'The Constitution does not say that the lawyer has to be awake." John
Makeig, Asleep on the Job; Slaying Trial Boring, Lawyer Said, HOUS. CHRON.,
Aug. 14, 1992, at A35. See also Dow, supra note 235, at 694 (describing the in-
ept representation of a client by his trial attorney, which included falling asleep
during the trial).
242. See Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 805 n.13 (11th Cir. 1982) (de-
scribing how trial counsel referred to defendant as a "little old nigger boy" dur-
ing closing argument); Ex parte Guzmon, 730 S.W.2d 724, 736 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987) (stating that the defense attorney referred to client as a "wet back").
243. See House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608, 612 (11th Cir. 1984).
244. See Heath v. Jones, 941 F.2d 1126, 1131-37 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. de-
nied, 502 U.S. 1077 (1992) ("The argument section of his subsequent brief to the
Alabama Supreme Court was only one page long.").
245. See People v. Garrison, 47 Cal. 3d 746, 785-88 (1986) (finding no pre-
sumption against the competence of counsel under the influence of alcohol).
246. For instance, the ABA suggests standards to ensure that lead trial
counsel:
ii. are experienced and active trial practitioners with at least five
years litigation experience in the field of criminal defense; and
iii. have prior experience as lead counsel in no fewer than nine jury
trials of serious and complex cases which were tried to completion, as
well as prior experience as lead counsel or co-counsel in at least one
case in which the death penalty was sought. In addition, of the ninejury trials which were tried to completion, the attorney should have
been lead counsel in at least three cases in which the charge was mur-
der or aggravated murder; or alternatively, of the nine jury trials, at
least one was a murder or aggravated murder trial and an additional
five were felony jury trials; and
iv. are familiar with the practice and procedure of the criminal
courts of the jurisdiction; and
v. are familiar with and experience in the utilization of expert wit-
nesses and evidence, including, but not limited to, psychiatric and fo-
rensic evidence, and ....
AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPORTIONMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (1989).
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B. Elimination of Post-Conviction Capital Defender
Organizations
Another damaging blow to the right to counsel occurred
in 1995 when Congress eliminated funding for the Post-
Conviction Capital Defender Organizations ("PCDOs"). 47 The
PCDOs provided post-conviction representation to many
death row inmates, located counsel for many others, and as-
sisted volunteer attorneys with the complexity of capital liti-
gation.24 The PCDOs effectively improved the quality of rep-
resentation for death row inmates.249  In fact, their
effectiveness contributed to their demise. Because of the
PCDOs, many inmates had quality legal representation,
which resulted in fewer executions. As a result, PCDOs be-
came targets for those seeking more executions at a swifter
pace and, thus, Congress eliminated their funding.
The Supreme Court and Congress delivered a one-two
punch to death row inmates' right to counsel. First, because
Strickland provides no standards to measure effectiveness of
counsel, defendants often receive inadequate counsel at the
trial level. Second, elimination of the PCDOs results in lower
quality of representation at the post-conviction stage.
VII. FURTHER DEREGULATION
A. Foreign Nationals
In recent years, courts have grappled with the issue of
foreign nationals and the death penalty. A foreign national is
"any individual from the sending state who has not renounced
citizenship in their country of origin or become a naturalized
immigrant in the receiving state."25 Foreign nationals in-
clude "tourists and visitors, migrant workers with temporary
permits, alien residents, illegal aliens, asylum-seekers and
persons in transit."25' There are approximately seventy-two
foreign nationals presently on death row in the United
247. See Eric Zorn, Cutting Subsidy for Death Appeals to Cost Time, Funds,
Ci1. TRIB., Feb. 21, 1996, at 1.
248. See id.
249. See Tabak, supra note 27, at 541.
250. Death Penalty Information Center, Foreign Nationals and the Death
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States. 2 When charged with a capital crime, foreign nation-
als are at a severe disadvantage. Most are unfamiliar with
U.S. customs, police policies, and criminal proceedings.253
Further, many are not fluent in English. Foreign nationals
may also be susceptible to deception used by police detectives
during interrogation. 4 They often face difficulties in devel-
oping mitigating evidence, since evidence of this type is likely
in their native country rather than in America.255  Finally,
foreign nationals are often victims of bias and racism.255
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions ("Vienna Convention") specifically addresses the issue of
foreign nationals charged with crimes while outside their na-
tive country.257 Under Article 36, the detaining state must fa-
252. See id. (indicating 42 of the foreign nationals on American death rows
are from Mexico and that no other nation has more than four of its citizens on
U.S. death rows).
253. See S. Adele Shank & John Quigley, Foreigners on Texas's Death Row
and the Right of Access to a Consul, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 719, 720 (1995).
254. See id.
255. See id. at 721.
256. See id. at 744.
257. Article 36 provides:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating
to nationals of the sending state:
(a) consular officials shall be free to communicate with nationals of
the sending state and to have access to them. Nationals of the
sending state shall have the same freedom with respect to commu-
nication with and access to consular officers of the sending state;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending
State if, within its consular district, a national of that state is ar-
rested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is de-
tained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the
consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or deten-
tion shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay.
The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without
delay of his rights under this subparagraph;
(c) consular officials shall have the right to visit a national of the
sending state who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse
and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representa-
tion. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their dis-
trict in pursuance of a judgement. Nevertheless, consular officials
shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in
prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exer-
cised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regula-
tions must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the
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cilitate contact between a detainee and his native consulate.
Specifically, the detaining state must: (1) inform a detainee of
his or her right to contact his native consulate; (2) facilitate
this contact if the detainee requests; and (3) provide the con-
sulate with access to the detainee.258 Once contacted, the con-
sulate may assist a detainee by obtaining counsel and trans-
lators;29 attempting to counteract potential bias against the
detainee by informing the prosecutor and judge early in the
process of its interest in the proceedings;2 6 providing the de-
tainee with information on the judicial procedures in the de-
taining state;261 determining whether the detainee has suf-
fered any physical abuse while in custody; and ensuring the
adequacy of the physical conditions of detention.262
Since international law is binding on the United States,
21
states must adhere to the requirements of Article 36 when
taking a foreigner into custody. However, foreign nationals
frequently are not informed of their right to contact their na-
tive consulates and death sentences are often imposed in
violation of Article 36.2' The failure of the United States to
adhere to Article 36 causes strains in its relations with for-
eign nations, particularly Mexico. 5  Several death row in-
mates have raised the issue on appeal and on habeas review.
In Breard v. Greene,266 where the U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari,267 it uncharacteristically issued a per curiam opin-
ion. 68 In its opinion, the majority refused to decide the case
rights accorded under this Article are intended.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36 (1)(a), 21
U.S.T. 77, 100-01; 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 292. The United States ratified the Con-
vention on November 24, 1969.
258. See id.
259. See Shank & Quigley, supra note 253, at 736.
260. See id. at 744.
261. See id. at 736.
262. See id.
263. See In re The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (indicating that
international law is U.S. law and must be administered by courts when applica-
ble).
264. See generally Shank & Quigley, supra note 253.
265. See, e.g., Executing Mexican Citizens in the U.S. Magnifies Differences of
Culture and "The Grudges that Exist between the Two Nations," HOUS. CHRON.,
Sept. 28, 1997, at 1A.
266. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
267. See id.
268. See id. It probably did so in order to explain to the government of Para-
guay the reasons for its actions.
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on the merits, failing to explain why it sanctioned executions
in violation of a clear legal commitment made by the United
States. Rather, the majority relied on three procedural rea-
sons to avoid addressing the Article 36 issue. First, the claim
was procedurally barred because it was not raised initially in
state court.269 Second, the Court found the claim novel, and
thus barred on habeas review. 7' Third, it applied the harm-
less error analysis to the claim: "Even were Beard's claim
properly raised and proven, it is extremely doubtful that the
violation should result in the overturning of a final judgement
of conviction without some showing that the violation had an
effect on the trial. In this case no such showing could even
arguably be made."71 A harmless error analysis of Article 36
violations, however, is improper. Consulate involvement at
an early stage likely entails the selection of counsel, which
frequently makes a difference, at least in sentencing. By
adopting a harmless error analysis, the Court signaled to the
states that compliance with Article 36 is completely voluntary
and that the Court again is not going to regulate the imposi-
tion of death by the states, despite a clear legal violation.
B. Clemency
Another important issue left unregulated by the U.S. Su-
preme Court is the clemency process. After exhausting ap-
peals, a death row inmate may apply for clemency. An appli-
cation for clemency is a plea for leniency or mercy, where an
inmate requests a pardon, (i.e., the conviction is erased and
the inmate set free) or, more typically, commutation of the
sentence (i.e., reduction of the inmate's death sentence to a
life sentence).2 The clemency process grants the death row
inmate an opportunity to tell his or her story fully, without
the constraints of the legal technicalities that characterize
judicial proceedings. 3 It is designed to consider the human-
ity of the offender. 4 An early Supreme Court decision re-
marked that the United States system of justice "would be
269. See id. at 375.
270. See id. at 377. See generally supra Part III.E.1.
271. Id.
272. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Evolving Role of Clemency in Capital Cases, in
AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNIsHMENT, supra note 35, at 531, 532.
273. See id. at 540.
274 See id.
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most imperfect and deficient in its political morality"75 with-
out a clemency process.
There are fifty-one different systems of clemency in the
United States.2 76 Therefore, it is not surprising that the clem-
ency process is fraught with arbitrariness and capriciousness.
For example, some governors grant seasonal commutations
around Christmas and Thanksgiving.2 7  Others have sold
pardons and commutations. 7 ' Further, the Governors of
Ohio279 and Illinois2 18 commuted death sentences solely be-
cause the applicants were women. Finally, in most states
there are few rules governing the clemency process.
In Ohio Parole Authority v. Woodard,28' an Ohio death
row inmate challenged the Ohio clemency process on due pro-
cess grounds.82 In Ohio, the Parole Authority must conduct a
clemency hearing at least forty-five days prior to a scheduled
execution.283 Prior to the hearing, an inmate may request an
interview with one or more parole board members." An in-
mate has no right to have counsel attend and participate in
either the interview or hearing. 5 The inmate in Woodard
filed suit alleging that Ohio's clemency process violated his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.28 In particular,
he objected to the short notice of the Parole Board interview
(seven days before the interview was scheduled) and to the
Board's prohibitioi on legal assistance at the interview. After
obtaining success in the U.S. Court of Appeals,287 the U.S. Su-
275. Exparte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 310 (1855).
276. See Kobil, supra note 272, at 531.
277. See id. at 535.
278. See id.
279. Before leaving office, Governor Richard Celeste of Ohio commuted the
sentences of all four women on Ohio's death row, while commuting the sen-
tences of only the four men most likely to be executed during the next four
years. See id. at 535, 536.
280. Numerous observers speculated that Guinevere Garcia's death sentence
was commuted by Governor Jim Edgar, his first in more than five years, be-
cause she was a woman. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Dead Women Walking: Com-
muted Death Sentences Raises Question Whether Females are Treated More Le-
niently, 82 A.B.A. J. 24 (1996).
281. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998).
282. See id. at 276.
283. See id. at 276-77.
284. See id. at 277.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that while the state
was not required to have a clemency process, once it established such a process
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preme Court found that Ohio's clemency system did not vio-
late his due process rights because "pardon and commutation
decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts;
as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judi-
cial review. Thus, the Court essentially concluded that a
state's clemency process never violates due process. 9 Under
the Court's reasoning, "even procedures infected by bribery,
personal or political animosity or the deliberate fabrication of
false evidence would be constitutionally acceptable."29 Fur-
thermore, as Justice O'Connor pointed out, "Uludicial inter-
vention might, for example, be warranted in the face of a
scheme whereby a state official flipped a coin to determine
whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the State arbi-
trarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency proc-
ess."291' However, without a system as facially arbitrary as
Justice O'Connor describes, any clemency system is safe from
Supreme Court review.
As a result of Woodard, a clemency process such as
Texas's can pass constitutional muster. In Texas, before any
governor may pardon a defendant, commute a conviction, or
commute a sentence, he must receive a favorable recommen-
dation from a majority of the Board of Pardons and Paroles.292
This Board is not required to meet as a body to determine
clemency matters,293 nor is it required to give any reasons for
its recommendations. 4 Board members may, but need not,
review documents and letters in support of clemency petitions
prior to voting on a clemency application.9 None of the in-
it must comport with due process. See Woodard, 523 U.S. at 277-78.
288. Id. at 280 (quoting Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S.
458, 464 (1981)).
289. "The Chief Justice takes a different view essentially concluding that a
clemency proceeding could never violate the due process clause." Id. at 290
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
290. Id. at 290-91.
291. Id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
292. See Faulder v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, No. A 98 CA 801 SS, at 9
(W.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 1998).
293. See id. at 10.
294. See id.
295. See id. at 13. In Joseph Faulder's case, there was evidence that a letter
a doctor wrote attacking the competency and validity of the testimony of the
state's psychiatric expert in the trial court was never passed on to Board mem-
bers. In addition, letters from a U.S. congressman and a national organization
representing thousands of churches in favor of Faulder's clemency were not
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formation provided in support of a clemency petition is inves-
tigated or verified."6 Despite a federal judge's conclusion that
"it is abundantly clear the Texas clemency procedure is ex-
tremely poor and certainly minimal . .. [and that] adminis-
tratively, the goal is more to protect the secrecy and auton-
omy of the system rather than carrying out an efficient,
legally sound system,"297 he felt compelled by Woodard to con-
clude that the Texas clemency procedure did not violate due
process."8 The judge suggested, however, that the Board hold
hearings and give reasons for its decisions in the future to en-
sure "the legality of the system and provide greater protection
against arbitrary or improper outcomes."299
The Supreme Court has decided not to regulate the clem-
ency system despite a history of arbitrariness in clemency de-
cisions. The Court's inaction signals that no clemency system
is too arbitrary for constitutional regulation.
VIII. WHY DEREGULATION HAS OCCURRED
This article demonstrates the failure of both the Supreme
Court and Congress to regulate the death penalty. The Court
fails to regulate the imposition of the death penalty, the
methods of execution, the individuals subject to capital pun-
ishment, the conditions on death row, and the clemency proc-
ess. It further refuses to address the issue of racism, despite
overwhelming evidence of a racially discriminatory imposi-
tion. The Court also fails to develop standards to ensure that
death row inmates have adequate counsel at trial and during
the appellate process. Finally, and perhaps most costly for
death row inmates, the U.S. Supreme Court, along with Con-
gress, has stripped the federal courts of the power to regulate
capital punishment by eviscerating the federal writ of habeas
corpus.
The question remains: why has deregulation of the most
severe form of punishment, meted out by a seriously flawed
passed on to Board members. See id.
296. See id. at 12. The Chairman of the Board of Pardons and Paroles con-
ceded that the Board has not called any hearings, interviewed any petitioners,
conducted any investigations, or requested any testimony since 1995, despite
considering 57 clemency petitions during this period. See id.
297. Id. at 16.
298. See Faulder, No. A 98 CA 801 SS, at 17.
299. Id. at 16-17.
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system, occurred? This article proposes two reasons for the
deregulation of the death penalty: (1) politics, and (2) a defer-
ence of the regulation of capital punishment to legislatures.
A. Political Reasons for the Deregulation of the Death
Penalty
Recent polls indicate that capital punishment enjoys the
overwhelming support of the American public."' Therefore, it
is a political liability for any candidate for public office to op-
pose capital punishment or even offer only lukewarm support
of the death penalty."' Both the Supreme Court and Con-
gress have responded to the public's thirst for the death pen-
alty. By deregulating the death penalty, Congress and the
Court have erred in responding to public support.
Congress's role in deregulating the death penalty is un-
derstandable, as it is a democratic institution. However, the
Supreme Court's response to public support of the death pen-
alty is troubling. The Supreme Court should function as an
undemocratic institution-a check on the political process.
Professor John Jeffries summarized the role of the Supreme
Court as follows:
[T]he courts should defer to political democracy, unless
there is a good reason not to. A good reason would be to
correct systemic unfairness in the way democracy is prac-
ticed. In this view, judges should abide by the results of
the political process (even those they find disagreeable),
300. See, e.g., CNN Morning News Transcript #99022505V09 (CNN television
broadcast, Feb. 25, 1999). A 1999 Gallup poll found that 71% of the American
public supported the death penalty and that 64% believed that it should be
utilized more frequently. See id.
301. For instance, the Governor of Missouri agreed to honor Pope John
Paul IIs request for mercy for a condemned killer. The Governor also had de-
cided earlier to run for a seat in the United States Senate. A poll conducted
shortly after the Governor's decision to commute the condemned killer's death
sentence produced the following results:
Q. At the request of Pope John Paul II, Carnahan commuted the
death-penalty sentence of convicted murderer Darrell Mease. How





Jo Mannies, Showing Mercy to Condemned Killer May Have Hurt Carnahan,
Poll Finds; Ashcroft Holds Edge in Senate Contest, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH,
Mar. 29, 1999, at Al.
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except where the process itself is skewed or distorted. In
that event, the courts should step in to see that everyone
is treated fairly. Under this reasoning, the courts have a
special duty toward those "discrete and insular minorities"
who are unable to fend for themselves in majoritarian
politics.
3°2
In performing this role, the Supreme Court has extended
special protections to racial minorities,0 3 women,30' aliens,. 5
and illegitimate children,0 6 because these groups cannot fend
for themselves in the political process. Yet, the Supreme
Court refuses to extend necessary protections to death row
inmates, although they are the most despised group in
America, a constituency without any political representation,
and completely unable to fend for themselves in the political
process. Instead, the Supreme Court follows public opinion
by permitting the death penalty notwithstanding its serious
constitutional concerns.
B. Undue Deference to Legislatures
The second reason for deregulating the death penalty de-
serves more respect because it is based on principle. Many
believe that courts should not regulate capital punishment,
but rather capital punishment should be left to the political
process. This was the early view of the late Justice Lewis
Powell. Justice Powell argued to let the people decide
whether to maintain the death penalty and that Supreme
Court intervention reflects "a basic lack of faith and comi-
dence in the democratic process."0 7 The legislature, rather
than the courts, should correct any defects in the administra-
tion of capital punishment:
Many may regret, as I do, the failure of some legislative
bodies to address the capital punishment issue with
greater frankness or effectiveness. Many may decry their
302. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 465-66 (1994).
303. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to ra-
cial classifications).
304. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (applying heightened
scrutiny to gender classifications).
305. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (applying heightened scrutiny
to alienage classifications).
306. See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (applying heightened scrutiny to
statutory classifications based on illegitimacy).
307. JEFFRIES, supra note 302, at 411.
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failure to abolish the penalty entirely or selectively, or to
establish nondiscriminatory standards for its enforcement.
But impatience with the slowness, and even the unrespon-
siveness, of legislatures is no justification for judicial in-
trusion upon their historic powers.
0 8
However, Justice Powell's earlier view fails to appreciate
the Supreme Court's role as a special protector of certain
groups unable to protect themselves in the democratic proc-
ess. As the Court has recognized, leaving the rights of mi-
norities to the political process often results in the rights of
these groups being trampled upon. No group better exempli-
fies this principle than death row inmates. These inmates
face state-sanctioned extinction, are universally despised,
have no representation, and are unable to even participate in
the political process. After witnessing firsthand the imposi-
tion of the death penalty, Justice Powell later abandoned his
early view.309
With the federal role in regulating the death penalty vir-
tually eliminated, the states stand alone in regulating the
imposition of the death penalty. The next section explores
why the state courts cannot be entrusted with this awesome
task and why the federal role must be reinstituted.
IX. WHY FEDERAL REGULATION IS NEEDED
This section offers three reasons why federal regulation
of the death penalty is essential: (1) state courts are not up to
the task, (2) the need to deter prosecutorial and police mis-
conduct, and (3) the danger of executing innocent individuals.
A. Inadequacy of State Courts
The AEDPA requires federal courts to defer to the state
courts' factual and legal findings.310 As a result, state courts
must ensure that capital defendants receive a fair trial and
that their death sentences are obtained in accordance with
the Constitution. Placing this responsibility with state courts
308. Id.
309. See id. at 451. After retiring from the Court, Justice Powell was asked
whether he would change his vote in any case. He replied that he "would vote
the other way in any capital case... [believing now that] capital punishment
should be abolished." Id.
310. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1996); see also supra Part III.F.
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is a mistake. State courts have a long history of practicing
racism, particularly in the South.31' Furthermore, in forty-
one states, judges either face an opponent in partisan or non-
partisan elections, or face the voters in retention elections.
312
Therefore, public opinion influences state judges. 1' Since
public opinion favors the death penalty, any judge who ren-
ders a decision in favor of a capital defendant is endangered.
Numerous judges have been voted out of office because of de-
cisions they rendered in capital cases.
For example, in Tennessee, Justice Penny White con-
curred in a decision entitling a capital defendant to a new
sentencing hearing. " This was the only capital case before
the Tennessee Supreme Court during Justice White's nine-
teen month tenure.315 Yet, the Republican Party launched a
campaign to unseat Justice White as a result of her concur-
rence in this one capital case.1 6 The campaign succeeded
when the voters of Tennessee voted against her retention.1 7
The Governor of Tennessee felt that White's unseating sent a
message to others on the court: "if I were them I'd be a little
worried."318 In California, voters removed Chief Justice Rose
Bird, along with two other Justices, from the bench as a re-
sult of their votes in capital cases.1 9 In Mississippi, Supreme
Court Justice James Robertson was voted off the Mississippi
311. See Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence be Attained in the
South? Overcoming History, Elections, and Misperceptions About the Role of the
Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 817 (1998), for an exhaustive account of the ra-
cism practiced by state courts from slavery to the present.
312. See supra note 34.
313. For instance, a poll conducted by the Hearst Corp. found that 81% of the
public believed that state judges' decisions are influenced by political considera-
tions and 78% agreed with a statement saying elected judges "are influenced by
having to raise campaign funds." Steve Lash, Confidence in Courts is Di-
vided/National Poll Shows Split Across Races, HOUS. CHRON., May 15, 1999, at
19A.
314. See Kirk Loggins, Death and Politics; A Sentence to Die is Overturned
and a Murder Case Turns into a Political Donnybrook, THE TENNESSEAN, Aug.
4, 1996, at 1D.
315. See Bright, The Politics of Capital Punishment, supra note 35, at 124.
316. A brochure was mailed by the state republican party urging voter to
"vote for capital punishment" by 'just saying no" to White. See Kirk Loggins,
Views Vary on White Aftereffect; Sundquist says Public Staged a 'Spontaneous'
Revolt over Rising Crime, THE TENNESSEAN, Aug. 3, 1996, at IA
317. See Kirk Loggins, State Turns Out Justice White; Vote Became Death
Penalty Referendum, THE TENNESSEAN, Aug. 2, 1996, at 1A.
318. Loggins, supra note 316, at 1A.
319. See Bright, The Politics of Capital Punishment, supra note 35, at 123.
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Supreme Court as a result of his concurrence in a capital case
where he declared that the Constitution did not permit the
death penalty for rape without the loss of life. ° Justice Rob-
ertson simply followed the U.S. Supreme Court, which earlier
held that application of the death penalty in such a circum-
stance was unconstitutional.321  Finally, in Texas, Stephen
Mansfield was elected to the Court of Criminal Appeals after
campaigning on a pledge to apply the death penalty more fre-
quently, use the harmless error doctrine more often, and ap-
ply sanctions for attorneys filing frivolous appeals in death
penalty cases.322
These illustrations demonstrate that state judges cannot
be entrusted with the responsibilities given them by Congress
and the Supreme Court in capital proceedings. Their inde-
pendence, impartiality, and integrity are too susceptible to
political attack to fairly decide capital cases.3
B. Deterrence of Prosecutorial and Police Misconduct
Prosecutorial misconduct is on the rise. 24  Since 1963,
sixty-seven defendants have received a sentence of death as a
result of prosecutorial misconduct.3" Thirty of these indi-
viduals were subsequently set free.326 Prosecutorial miscon-
duct occurs in such greater numbers because of the pressure
to win. This pressure is greatest in murder cases, which are
320. See id. at 123-24.
321. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
322. See Bright, The Politics of Capital Punishment, supra note 35, at 123.
323. See American Bar Ass'n Report of Comm'n on Professionalism (1986)
("[J]udges are far less likely to take... tough action if they must run for reelec-
tion or retention every few years."); see also Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
713 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
[E]lected judges too often appear to listen [to] the many voters who
generally favor capital punishment but who have far less information
about a particular trial than the jurors who have sifted patiently
through the details of the relevant and admissible evidence. How else
do we account for the disturbing propensity of elected judges to impose
the death sentence time after time notwithstanding a jury's recommen-
dation of life?
Id.
324. See, e.g., Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prose-
cutors Sacrifice Justice to Win, Ci. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at 1; Rhonda Bell,
Evidence Flap Has DA on Defensive, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, May 31,
1999, at Al.
325. See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 324, at 1.
326. See id.
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often high-profile and receive increased public attention.
Efforts to deter prosecutorial misconduct have proven
unsuccessful. In Brady v. Maryland,"' the U.S. Supreme
Court imposed a constitutional duty upon prosecutors to dis-
close evidence favorable to the accused. Despite Brady,
prosecutorial misconduct continues, as the numbers quoted
above reflect. Prosecutors rarely face criminal charges for
misconduct."8 In addition, prosecutors enjoy absolute immu-
nity from civil liability."9 Finally, prosecutors are not held
accountable by the voters.
In addition to prosecutorial misconduct, several individu-
als are on death row as a result of police misconduct.30 As
with prosecutors, no real deterrent to police misconduct ex-
ists. The prosecution of police officers occurs infrequently,
usually only in high-profile cases where minority communi-
ties bring pressure for such prosecutions. Further, police offi-
cers enjoy qualified immunity from civil liability.331 Even
where qualified immunity does not apply,332 the government
usually indemnifies the officer for any damages imposed.333
327. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
328. See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 324, at 1 (finding that despite 381
instances of documented prosecutorial misconduct, not a single prosecutor was
convicted of a crime nor barred from the practice of law; instead, many went on
to become judges or district attorneys).
329. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
330. For instance, Illinois death row inmate Anthony Porter, freed from
death row after 16 years, was convicted primarily because of "the worst kind of
railroading" by the police. See Carpenter & Rodriguez, supra note 128, at Al.
Furthermore, Ronald Jones was released from death row after DNA tests per-
formed eight years after he was sentenced to die confirmed that he could not
have committed the murder. He said at his trial that he had confessed to the
crime because police had beaten him so badly that "I just couldn't take it no
more." Dirk Johnson, 12th Death Row Inmate in Illinois Is Cleared, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 1999, at A14.
331. Qualified immunity means that a public official is immune from civil
liability as long as he or she acted in good faith. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635 (1987); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
332. See Alfredo Garcia, The Scope of Police Immunity from Civil Suit Under
Title 42 Section 1983 and Bivens: A Realistic Appraisal, 11 WH[TTIER L. REV.
511, 534 (1989) (concluding that "the individual citizen who seeks redress for a
constitutional violation faces a formidable obstacle").
333. For instance, a study of constitutional tort litigation in California found
"no case in which court records showed that an individual official had borne the
cost of an adverse constitutional tort judgement." See Theodore Eisenberg &
Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 641, 685-86 (1987).
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The only real deterrence to prosecutorial and police mis-
conduct is federal court regulation. State courts cannot effec-
tively regulate the conduct of prosecutors and police because
state judges are likely to face the wrath of the voters should
they overturn popular convictions. Only federal judges, in-
sulated from public opinion with life tenures, can effectively
perform this function. Federal judges may send a message to
prosecutors and police that unconstitutionally obtained con-
victions will not be tolerated. Only by sending this message
will misconduct decrease. The federal courts' failure to send
this message has lead to the recent increase in misconduct by
prosecutors and police. Stringent federal regulation is the
only effective mechanism for deterring misconduct by prose-
cutors and police.
C. Danger of Executing Innocent Persons
Since the resumption of the death penalty in 1976, eighty
individuals were wrongly sentenced to die."u In many cases,
evidence of their innocence did not come to light until many
years after their initial conviction.35 This disturbingly high
number of innocent individuals receiving death sentences re-
quires courts to thoroughly scrutinize capital cases. Federal
judges, with their lifetime appointment and insulation from
politics, must control this process. Frustration with the
length of the capital appellate process cannot justify sacrific-
ing the accuracy of capital convictions.
X. CONCLUSION
A reader of this article may conclude that the author op-
poses capital punishment and has written this article to ex-
pose the system as dysfunctional and thereby advance an
abolitionist agenda. Such a conclusion is inaccurate. The
author has no objection to the concept of capital punishment
334. See Charles Whitaker, The Death Penalty Debate: Are We Killing Inno-
cent Black Men?, EBONY, May 1999, at 100-01.
335. For instance, Anthony Porter spent 16 years on Illinois' death row. See
White & Jackson, supra note 106, at 1. Furthermore, according to Northwest-
ern University's Legal Clinic, James Richardson spent 21 years on Florida's
death row, James Robison spent 16 years on Arizona's, Troy Lee Jones spent 14
years on California's, and Roberto Miranda spent 14 years on Nevada's death
row. See National Conf. on Wrongful Convictions and the Death Penalty, The
Wrongfully Accused (visited Mar. 16, 2000) <http'//www.ncwcdp.com/
wrongly.html>.
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and actually supports it in certain extreme cases, such as
those involving war criminals and multiple murderers. This
article simply demonstrates how the Supreme Court and
Congress sacrifice fairness, accuracy, and principles, in order
to advance the death penalty. This is simply unacceptable in
a society that renders the pursuit of justice its bedrock tenet.
Courts appear to lack the integrity required to adminis-
ter justice in this area. Congress appears irresponsible and
bloodthirsty. Juries and judges are ambivalent in meting out
the death penalty because of their concern with the fairness
of the system. As a result of diminished concerns with accu-
racy and fairness, more innocent individuals are convicted
and suffer the torment of spending a good portion of their
lives on death row. The unluckiest individuals will be wrong-
fully executed.
However, fairness need not be sacrificed in the pursuit of
justice. As Justice Douglas stated: "Society wins not only
when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are
fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when
any accused is treated unfairly." "3 '
336. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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